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This thesis examines the different public roles Palestinian women have assumed 
during the contemporary history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The thesis uses the 
problematic juxtaposition between the high public visibility of female militants and 
relatively low visibility of female political figures as a basis for investigating individual 
Palestinian women and women's groups that have participated in the Palestinian public 
sphere from before the first Intifada to the present. The thesis addresses the current state 
of Palestine's political structure, how international sources of support for enhancing 
women's political participation might be implemented, and internal barriers Palestinian 
women face in becoming politically active and gaining leadership roles. It draws the 
conclusions that while Palestinian women do participate in the political sphere, greater 
cohesion between existing women's groups and internal support from society and the 
political system is needed before the number of women in leadership positions can be 
increased; and that inclusion of women is a necessary component ofbeing able to move 
forward in peace negotiations. 
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Introduction  
One very widely recognized conflict of our time is the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. This bloody struggle has endured for over a century and involves a complex 
web of players, alliances, and grudges that have brought about the death of many and 
disrupted the lives of countless others. According to one source, at least 1,104 Israelis 
and 6,836 Palestinians have been killed since 2000 alone, and many more have been 
injured.1 The same source states that while the number of Israelis who are being killed 
has decreased since 2002, the number of Palestinians being killed has remained 
relatively high. The situation is desperate, especially for Palestinians, many of whom 
are extremely limited in their mobility and ability to provide for themselves and their 
families. Attempts at peace negotiations and the development of a two-state solution 
have so far been unsuccessful. Of course, there are Israelis and Palestinians on both 
sides of the conflict as well as outside influences that do not support a two-state 
solution, and this diversity of intractable desires has contributed substantially to the 
problem.  
What is probably not at the forefront of most people’s consciousness when 
thinking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the apparent absence of Palestinian 
women in the processes of negotiating and solidifying a solution. When I began 
researching for this project, I was struck by my personal lack of knowledge about the 
number of Palestinian women who are politically active and who participate in conflict 
negotiation and resolution, as well as the lack of information that is available to                                                         
1 “Fatalities,” The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, B’Tselem, 
2013, Accessed 19 December 2013, http://www.btselem.org/statistics. 
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researchers or the general public on the topic. Even more powerful was the realization 
that the only Palestinian woman I knew by name was a suicide bomber named Ayat al-
Akhras, and that I did not know whether there were in fact any women involved in 
high-level Palestinian politics. I believe that many other Americans would share my 
experience, or even be completely unaware of the issue. This made me wonder: Where 
are all the women? In addition, if women are politically involved, why are they not 
readily visible except as agents of violence? 
 We in the United States are perhaps more aware of the Israeli side of the 
conflict than the Palestinian side. The U.S. sends around $4 billion in aid to Israel 
annually and has been its staunch ally even in the face of UN criticism for the continued 
building of illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank.2 The U.S. also provides about 
$440 million in aid to Palestine, but with the qualifiers that recipient organizations and 
entities cannot have any connection to Hamas or terrorism and must be firmly 
committed to peaceful coexistence with the Israeli state.3  The United States has a big 
stake in helping Israel achieve its goals, and this coupled with a governmental and 
media bias may explain the limitation of my personal knowledge of female participants 
in the conflict as well as the media focus on female militants as terrorists. However, it 
does not explain the lack of accessible and specific information about Palestinian 
women who are involved at all levels of politics. One of the purposes of this project is 
to demonstrate that women’s political participation is wider than what is made apparent 
by mainstream media, and that women are also, and even more often, making an impact                                                         
2 Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service (11 April 2013), 2, Accessed 19 
December 2013,  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf. 
3 Jim Zanotti, “U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians,” Congressional Research Service (30 Sep. 2013), 3, 
Accessed 19 December 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf. 
 
 
3  
through peacebuilding instead of militancy. However, there are significant barriers such 
as a lack of cohesiveness in NGO and grassroots activism and the resurgence of Islamic 
fundamentalism that discourage women from becoming politically active and have 
impeded their visibility. In contrast, female militants have been celebrated by many 
within Palestine and the wider Arab community and heavily publicized internationally 
and within the region. This is a paradigm that needs to change, because the political 
participation of Palestinian women is a vital part of building a stable Palestinian state. 
To accomplish this shift, there needs to be a substantial amount of support both 
internally and externally that will both strengthen existing female participation and 
encourage its expansion. 
 This discussion begins with an historical overview of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and an explanation of the main bodies of the Palestinian political 
system. I then present a contrast between women’s involvement in militancy and 
women’s involvement in politics, introducing individual women and organizations who 
have made an impact on their society, and demonstrating that while women do 
participate in government and in building up their nation, overall there is a paucity of 
women in positions of political authority. Finally, I illustrate several sources of 
international support for integrating women more fully into the political process, as well 
as the main obstacles that Palestinian women face in becoming more politically active 
and effective.  
 
 
4  
A brief history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict   
The issue of who has more of a right to the land disputed by Palestine and Israel 
has roots even as far back as biblical times. This is shown by the idea of God’s promise 
that the children of Abraham would have ownership of the historical site of the Jewish 
kingdom of Israel, which happens to be situated in an area that has been populated 
mostly by Arabs and Muslims for hundreds of years.4 However, I am choosing to focus 
on the more contemporary developments because they provide an important background 
for examining the present-day state of Palestinian women’s political participation. An 
overwhelming number of events have occurred in the time stretching from the 1800s 
until now, which explain the intricacies of the conflict. It is far from simple, and many 
layers of distrust, hatred, violence, and fear have stacked up on both sides and shaped 
the trajectory to the present. I have tried to distill some of the most significant events, 
but it should be noted that there is much more to the narrative. 
In 1915 the British government promised the leader of Mecca and Medina that 
an independent Arab state would be created in exchange for Arab military support 
against the Ottomans.5 The next year France, England, and Russia secretly reached the 
Sykes-Picot agreement which divided up large portions of the Ottoman Empire, leaving 
most of Palestine under international control and leaving many Arabs feeling misled 
and distrustful.6 In 1917 the Balfour Declaration established British support for a Jewish 
                                                        
4 Be on our Side Campaign, “Roots of the Conflict,” Two Peoples One Future, Committee for a Just 
Peace in Israel and Palestine (2014), Accessed 28 April 2014, 
http://www.twopeoplesonefuture.org/background/roots-of-conflict/.  
5 Joel Peters and David Newman, eds., The Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 367. 
6 Ibid. 
 
 
5  
national homeland in Palestine and in 1920 the British Mandate for Palestine was 
approved, which encompassed the area of present-day Israel/Palestine and Jordan.7 In 
the years that followed there was a large influx of Jewish immigrants to the area, land 
disputes involving both sides, and fear of a Jewish state that led to Arab protest and 
armed action. The UN partition plan of 1947 called for a division of Palestine into an 
Israeli and a Palestinian state with Jerusalem under international control. Jewish leaders 
supported the plan but Palestinian leaders and the Arab League rejected it, resulting in a 
civil war.8 In 1948 the British Mandate was set to expire and Jewish leaders declared 
independence. This prompted forces from Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq to 
take up arms against Israel, and the end of the war in 1949 produced armistice 
agreements that became the boundaries of Israel that would be used for future territorial 
negotiations.9  
 In 1959 the group Fatah was founded by Yasser Arafat and other activists, with 
the vision of defeating Israel by force and completely liberating Palestine.10 This grew 
into the 1964 creation of the governing body called the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) which at the time declared the establishment of Israel illegal.11 In 
1967 Israel won a decisive victory against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day/June 
War, which resulted in the capture of the West Bank, The Old City (East) Jerusalem, 
Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza Strip for Israeli control.12 In 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked 
Israel in the Yom Kippur/October War which was initially successful, but then                                                         
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 368. 
9 Ibid., 369. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
 
 
6  
diminished in victory as Israel recaptured nearly all of the territory it had lost.13 
However, this was humbling for Israel and is counted as a symbolic victory by the Arab 
community. 
 
Figure 1: Division of authority in Israel/Palestine as of 201214 
Violent conflict between Israel and Palestine built until the first Intifada 
(“shaking off”) in 1987, where Israeli efforts to suppress both non-militant civil 
disobedience and acts of militancy were largely unsuccessful and drew attention to 
Israel’s limitations in controlling the Occupied Territories.15 The Intifada also led to the 
creation of Hamas, a militant Islamist group that at the time was completely dedicated 
to the destruction of Israel. Between 1991 and 2000 several peace talks between Israeli                                                         
13 Ibid. 
14 Citation for image here! 
15 Peters, et al., 372. 
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and Palestinian delegations were held, but nothing decisive came of them beside the 
1993 Oslo Accords, which established an interim governing body called the Palestinian 
Authority that would be allowed to take back control of Gaza and the West Bank.16 In 
1996 Yasser Arafat was elected as president of the Palestinian National Authority.17 In 
2000 the Al-Aqsa (or second) Intifada erupted, where violence on both sides of the 
conflict reached new heights. In a period of four years, over 1,000 Israelis and 5,000 
Palestinians were killed and many more were wounded.18  
In 2005 Israel began suspending its settlements in Gaza and the area was turned 
over to Palestinian control, and the next year Hamas was elected to power in the PLO.19 
In 2008 violence intensified again and Israel’s aggressive action prompted a UN report 
alleging Israeli war crimes, but nevertheless in 2010 Israel resumed its establishment of 
new settlements in the West Bank, an action that has been condemned as illegal by the 
UN and international law.20 These settlements and attacks and retaliation from both 
sides continue to the present, and bitterness has in no way diminished. 
There are currently walls erected around the West Bank and Gaza that are 
guarded by Israeli soldiers and which serve both to protect Israelis and to contain 
Palestinians. This construction results in poverty and a very restricted life for 
Palestinians. Rockets are regularly fired back and forth between Israel and the Gaza 
Strip, causing destruction, injury, and death on both sides. Despite repeated attempts at 
peace talks, a two-state solution has not been reached. The respective narratives of each 
                                                        
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 373. 
18 Ibid., 5. 
19 Ibid., 375. 
20 Ibid., 376. 
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side of the conflict differ greatly, and the narratives exist as fundamental parts of 
people’s individual and collective identities. Many on both sides distrust one another 
because of each side’s perception of its historical experience. “Thus, it is impossible for 
many on both sides to see their adversaries as not historically deceptive, and themselves 
. . . as [anything other than] ‘righteous victims.’”21 This is perhaps the biggest obstacle 
to peace, and one that has been virtually intractable in the history of negotiations.  
                                                        
21 Ibid., 42-3. 
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Palestinian political structure  
In order to understand the relationship between Palestinian women and the 
Palestinian political system, it is necessary to first break down the basic structure of 
Palestinian governance. While there are female representatives at all levels of 
government, decision-making positions within the bodies described below are almost 
completely allocated for men. This imbalance of power has shaped the political climate 
of Palestine and made it more difficult for women to participate. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization  
The PLO was founded in 1964 by Egypt and the Arab League as a coordinating 
council for Palestinian organizations, and was originally controlled by Egypt.22 The 
PLO calls itself the “embodiment of the Palestinian national movement,” and is made 
up of various organizations of the resistance movement, political parties, popular 
organizations, and independent figures from all sectors of life.23 Some of these include 
the communist groups the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), as well as the smaller 
Palestinian People’s Party and Palestinian Liberation Front. The largest faction within 
the PLO is Fatah, which while chaired by Yasser Arafat from 1969 to 2004 established 
Palestinian control over the whole organization. In October 1974 the General Assembly                                                         
22 “Palestinian Liberation Organization,” Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. (2013) Academic 
Search Premier, Accessed 24 February 2014, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/ehost/detail?sid=661f7655-49cf-47f7-b84d-
7e96a225d7ec%40sessionmgr4003&vid=1&hid=4114&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT
1zaXRl#db=apa&AN=39026358. 
23 “Palestine Liberation Organization,” Permanent Observer Mission of The State of Palestine to the 
United Nations, New York (2014) Accessed 24 February 2014, http://palestineun.org/about-
palestine/palestine-liberation-organization/. 
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of the UN voted to invite a spokesperson from the PLO to take part in its deliberations, 
a privilege which had never been granted to a non-state actor before. Since then, the 
PLO has been seen as the main legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in a 
variety of forums and as the government-in-exile responsible for Palestinian affairs.  
Initially, the PLO was committed to the dissolution of Israel, mainly through 
force. For the first half of its existence the PLO was associated with various acts of 
militancy against Israel and Israeli citizens, and came to be known at least in the U.S. 
and Europe as a terrorist organization. In 1993 Israel and the PLO negotiated and signed 
the Oslo Accords which provided mutual recognition and a transition to an amount of 
self-rule for Palestine in Gaza and the West Bank.24 In 1996 the PLO formally revoked 
all clauses in its charter that called for the dissolution of Israel, and Arafat also pledged 
to fight against terrorism.25 Further agreements in the late 1990s increased the amount 
of territory in the West Bank under Palestinian control. 
The Palestinian National Council is the highest decision-making body of the 
PLO and is responsible for setting PLO policies, making changes to the Palestinian 
National Charter, and electing members of the Executive Committee and other official 
positions.26  The composition of the PNC is supposed to represent “all sectors of the 
Palestinian community worldwide,” comprising around eight hundred representatives.27 
The secondary leading body of the PLO is the Central Council, which includes 
members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and serves as the intermediary between 
the PNC and the Executive Committee. This eighteen-member committee represents the                                                         
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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PLO at the international level and is elected by members of the PNC. It is responsible 
for executing policies set by the PNC and Central Council, and adopting a budget and 
overseeing the various departments of the PLO. Currently the Committee is chaired by 
Mahmoud Abbas, who is also the president of the PA. The only female member of the 
Committee is Hanan Ashrawi, 28 an extremely active and internationally well-known 
woman who serves as the head of the Department of Culture and Information and will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 
The Palestinian National Authority 
As mentioned earlier in the brief history of the conflict, the PA was established 
in 1994 after the 1993 Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements with Israel in order to 
serve as an interim self-government for the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank. Presently the PA is based in Ramallah and consists of a president, prime 
minister and cabinet, a legislative council, and security forces.29 In 1996 the first 
Palestinian Legislative Council was elected. Also at that time, Yasser Arafat was 
elected as president of the PA in addition to his leadership position within the PLO. 
After these elections his Fatah party controlled a majority of the seats. Arafat died in 
2004 and was replaced the next year by Mahmoud Abbas. In the years following his 
                                                        
28 “Hanan Ashrawi,” The Guardian (2014), Accessed 24 February 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/profile/hanan-ashrawi. 
29 “Palestinian Authority,” Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition (2013), 1, Academic Search 
Premier, Accessed 10 February 2014, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/ehost/detail?sid=943c37c5-b6f7-4f14-8810-
120dedfce8f2%40sessionmgr4004&vid=1&hid=4114&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT
1zaXRl#db=aph&AN=39026359. 
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appointment there were attempts and failures at peacemaking with Israel, resulting in 
temporary withdrawal of some Israeli settlements and violence on both sides.30   
In the legislative elections of 2006, Hamas won a majority of the seats due in 
part to the corruption and failures associated with Fatah.31 Because Hamas refused to 
recognize Israel’s right to exist, both outside aid from the United States and other 
entities and taxes and duties collected for the PA by Israel were cut off, resulting in a 
financial crisis within Palestine. There was also conflict within the PA over who would 
control the security forces between Abbas and Hamas political leaders. In 2007 Hamas 
and Fatah agreed to form a power-sharing government, but tensions between the two 
sometimes escalated into violence and Hamas continued to refuse to accept Israel as a 
state.32 These violent clashes led to Hamas physically seizing control of the Gaza Strip 
in the same year, a move which was labeled as a coup by Abbas. He subsequently 
dismissed the existing government and appointed a new one which did not include 
Hamas, effectively dividing the PA into two territories and two governments with 
Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip and Fatah in control of the West Bank. In 2009, the 
PLO voted to extend Abbas’s presidency indefinitely, and attempts to reestablish a 
unified government had been unsuccessful until very recently, as discussed below. 
Hamas 
Hamas is the largest and most influential Palestinian militant movement that 
shares most of the power in the PA alongside Fatah. The name is an acronym that 
stands for Harakat al-Muqawana al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement). Sheikh                                                         
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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Ahmed Yassin, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, helped found Hamas in 
1987 during the first Intifada as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas has 
been listed by the U.S. as a terrorist organization since 1997. The organization 
possesses both military and political wings, but in addition to militant activities it 
manages a large and mostly Gaza-based network of social services.33 Hamas funds 
schools, orphanages, mosques, health clinics, soup kitchens, and sports leagues, 
expending around 90% of its effort on social, welfare, cultural, and educational 
activities.34 The overall policy of Hamas is set by a Shura council that was based in 
Damascus until late 2011. It has a presence in every major Palestinian city and retains a 
cadre of leaders and facilitators who conduct political, fundraising, and militant 
activities throughout the region.35 
Prior to 2005, Hamas conducted many militant operations against Israel but 
much of the violence ended in 2006 after it gained control of the PA. The 2007 takeover 
of Gaza from the PA and Fatah resulted in the closing of Gaza’s borders, forcing Hamas 
to increase its use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into the area. Since then, Hamas “has 
dedicated the majority of its activity in Gaza to solidifying its control, hardening its 
defenses, tightening security, and conducting limited operations against Israeli military 
forces.”36 On January 18th 2009, Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire, and ironically the 
                                                        
33 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Hamas,” Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. 
Department of State (31 July, 2012), Accessed 17 February 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm#hamas.   
34 Jonathan Masters, “Hamas,” Council on Foreign Relations (27 November 2012), Accessed 17 February 
2014 , http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968. 
35 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 
36 Ibid. 
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trend since then has been an increased firing of rockets and mortars from Gaza, violence 
which is returned by Israel in spite of its official disengagement.37  
In 2011 Hamas and Fatah signed an agreement of reconciliation vowing 
common cause against the Israeli occupation with the goal of achieving “a Palestinian 
state with full sovereignty on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as the capital, no settlers, 
and [refusing to] give up the right of return.”38 However, Hamas continues to resist 
fully accepting the idea of Israel’s right to existence as a state while Fatah has 
recognized it, and the two factions have often been at odds with each other. 
The new unity government 
In January 2013, Abbas signed a decree stating that the Palestinian National 
Authority had been absorbed and replaced by the State of Palestine.39 The PA had 
“served its purpose by introducing the institutions of the State of Palestine on the soil of 
Palestine,” and due to its origin as an interim governing body, it was phased out in 
conjunction with Palestine being recognized (at least by the UN) as a UN Non-Member 
Observer State.40 This decree is a representation of Palestine’s intent to be fully 
recognized as a sovereign state, even though it is not necessarily recognized as a state 
by the rest of the world. 
                                                        
37 Masters. 
38 Ethan Bronner, “Palestinian factions sign accord to end rift,” The New York Times (4 May 2011), 
Accessed 17 February 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/world/middleeast/05palestinians.html?_r=0.  
39 John V. Whitbeck, “The state of Palestine’s Decree No. 1 and the two-state solution,” Washington 
Report on Middle East Affairs, 32.2 (March 2013), 10, Accessed 23 February 2014, 
http://go.galegroup.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/ps/retrieve.do?sgHitCountType=None&sort=RELEVANC
E&inPS=trtr&prodId=AONE&userGroupName=s8492775&tabID=T003&searchId=R1&resultListType
=RESULT_LIST&contentSconten=&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&contentSet
=GALE|A318902827&&docId=GALE|A318902827&docType=GALE&role=. 
40 Ibid. 
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Further progression has recently been made under a new agreement announced 
on Tuesday, April 23rd 2014, in which the rival groups of Fatah and Hamas have agreed 
to form a new unity government under the umbrella of the PLO.41 The groups plan to 
form an interim government at the end of May 2014, and hold elections six months 
later.42 “At a news conference, leaders of all the groups said the past divisions had taken 
a toll on the Palestinian goal of establishing an independent state with Jerusalem as its 
capital.”43 A representative of Hamas said, “After seven years of enforced division, we 
are determined to regain the Palestinian democratic process.”44 The unification of Fatah 
and Hamas may be an important step in the struggle for self-determination that 
Palestine faces. “Discussions on Tuesday night in Gaza centered on forming a new 
national government, while on Wednesday the focus was on the timing and procedures 
for elections, and how to actually make a political program of negotiation and social 
reconciliation that will include all factions and independents. Out of necessity at this 
early stage, the discussions were general, rather than specific in order to allow the 
factions to consult with their bases before making final decisions.”45 For now, Abbas is 
set to lead the technocratic government that will be formed within 5 weeks and is 
subsequently charged with holding presidential and parliamentary elections.46 
                                                        
41 “Palestinian factions to form unity government,” Al Jazeera (23 April 2014), Accessed 4 May  2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/palestinian-factions-form-unity-government-
2014423134227518508.html. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Julie Webb-Pullman, “Challenges await Palestine unity government,” The Palestine Chronicle (24 
April 2014), Accessed 4 May 2014, http://www.palestinechronicle.com/challenges-await-palestine-unity-
government/#.U2b5xlfN4TA. 
45 Ibid. 
46 “Palestinian unity government will reject violence: Abbas,” Daily News Egypt (26 April 2014), 
Accessed 4 May 2014, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/04/26/palestinian-unity-government-will-
reject-violence-abbas/. 
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Israel stated that it would not negotiate with a government backed by Hamas, 
but Abbas has stated that the upcoming government will obey his policy, which 
recognizes Israel and rejects violence and terrorism.47 He also stressed that the PLO, not 
the newly formed government, would be responsible for the ongoing negotiations with 
Israel because it represents the entire Palestinian people and is internationally 
recognized.48 However, Israel may choose to ignore these assurances and reject 
negotiation with any governing body associated with Hamas. This may be a further 
detriment to already-faltering peace talks.  
                                                        
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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Making an impact through violence  
As the conflict has endured over decades, two main avenues of resolution have 
emerged: violent action and political negotiation. Especially during the second Intifada, 
violence reached unprecedented levels due in part to an increase in suicide bombings 
and other militant operations against Israel. While the primary participants in violence 
have been men, women have made an important and marked contribution as well. In the 
case of violent action, women have become involved as a way to try and make a 
difference in a conflict where there are not very many options for effective ways of 
opposing Israel. Becoming militants is one way women have been encouraged by some 
in society and positions of authority to contribute to the Palestinian cause, where by 
contrast they are not similarly encouraged to participate in the political sphere. To 
understand the impact of women’s participation in violence, it is important to 
understand the concept of jihad and how it applies to the Palestinian situation, as well as 
how women can at times be more effective than men as agents of violence. 
Jihad 
The term “jihad” is one which is seen by many as being very loaded because it is 
often associated with terrorism and events like the 9/11 attacks. Many people would 
mistakenly think that it stands for “holy war,” but in reality it has a spectrum of 
meanings. Literally, the Arabic word means “exerted effort” or “striving.” Jihad is seen 
by some as being divisible into two categories: the greater jihad and the lesser jihad.49 
The greater jihad is the struggle within each Muslim to adhere to God’s path and follow                                                         
49 John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 114. 
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the teachings of the Quran, leading a good life and reflecting inward for self-
improvement. The lesser jihad is the defensive and plausibly violent struggle. This 
interpretation of jihad has become “a clarion call used by resistance, liberation, and 
terrorist movements alike to legitimate their causes, mobilize support, and motivate 
their followers.”50 The term is almost always associated with Islam, but it has been used 
by nationalist (secular) leaders as well, like Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian National 
Authority.51  
Jihad is a powerful idea because it gives people a cause to rally around, one 
behind which they can rise up and defend their community or country when it is 
endangered and are justified in using proportionate force in retaliation to threats. The 
Quran says, “Fight those in the way of God who fight you, but do not be aggressive: 
God does not like aggressors,” [2:190] and “Fight them till sedition comes to end, and 
the law of God (prevails). If they desist, then cease to be hostile, except against those 
who oppress” [2:193].52 These verses support defending the umma (Muslim 
community) against attacks in a proportionate manner. Of course, these justifications 
for a violent (and regulated) struggle can be manipulated to fit a diverse array of 
situations, and deciding what qualifies as self-defense is also interpreted very differently 
depending upon who is making the decision.  
In the Palestinian context, jihad against Israel is seen by some as a just defense 
of the Palestinian homeland from an oppressive occupying force that is vastly superior 
in force. The conflict has thus far been intractable, and Palestinian militants have 
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employed tactics like suicide bombings in an attempt to make an impact against their 
formidable enemy. Umm Anas, a female eighteen-year-old Islamic Jihad operative in 
Gaza interviewed by the BBC, believes that suicide bombing (martyrdom in her eyes) 
allows the Palestinians to level the balance of power between the two sides, helping 
Palestinians defend their land by using any means at their disposal.53 Palestinians lack 
the resources that Israel has, such as tanks, planes, helicopters, missiles, and bombs. In a 
situation where Palestinian stone-throwing is met with volleys of tear gas and 
sometimes even live ammunition, the ability to use a weapon that strikes fear into 
Israelis has become very important to Palestinian militant activists. Umm Anas says, 
“’Jews are scared when we just throw stones. Imagine what happens when body parts 
fly at them.’”54 Her words are chilling, but they represent the sense of empowerment 
that some Palestinians have found in carrying out these militant and suicide operations. 
Women as particularly effective suicide bombers 
Mia Bloom, a Professor of Security Studies at the University of Massachusetts, 
Lowell, asserts that female suicide bombers are more effective than their male 
counterparts for a variety of reasons.55 Chiefly, they have been much less likely to draw 
the attention of Israeli soldiers or others at checkpoints, or at the entrance to a restaurant 
or bus or on the street. This enables them to move more deeply into their target, whether 
it be a building or a part of the city. As the success (degree of destruction) of a bombing 
mission depends upon how far within a structure a bomb is detonated, the ability to 
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escape attention becomes extremely valuable to would-be bombers. Palestinian women 
blend into Israeli society by adopting Western styles of dress and physical appearance, 
or are able to conceal explosives beneath a billowing abaya or other loose clothing. The 
use of Western styles of dress is much less typical for Muslim women than it is for men, 
so a woman who appears to be Israeli or foreign is less likely to come under suspicion. 
Women can also aid the disguise of male accomplices by posing as part of a couple. 
Even if a woman does appear to be suspicious, physical searches of Palestinian women 
by soldiers are taboo, especially when performed in public, and generate a great deal of 
negative reaction within Palestinian society. Consequently, soldiers have often been 
reluctant to perform these searches. This cultural structure also aids women in gaining 
access to their target areas.  
Additionally, women’s action in suicide bombings has had a large impact on the 
image of Palestinian militant resistance groups and the amount of international attention 
given to the conflict in general. In complement to the Islam-based idea of jihad, there 
additionally exists a “cultural terrain that assumes Arab men [in particular] should act in 
decisive ways when the [Arab or Muslim] community is under attack.”56 Traditionally 
men are the ones who go to war to defend their land and people, and women are the 
ones who suffer stoically behind the scenes. Before women’s participation became 
relatively common, Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, founder of Hamas, said that “the woman is 
the second defense line in the resistance to the occupation. She shelters the fugitive, 
loses the son, husband, and brother, bears the consequences of this, and faces starvation 
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and blockade.”57 This paints a picture of Palestinian women as suffering in silence 
under attacks from Israel, unable to do anything but mourn the loss of the men in their 
community who fight bravely in defense of their land and people. This is far from the 
reality of the situation, especially during the second Intifada and at present. Women’s 
participation in militancy challenges the norms of duty and responsibility to the 
Palestinian cause because it changes who protects the community and who is being 
protected within it.  
When Palestinian women have chosen or been recruited to carry out violent acts 
against Israel and Israelis, they have made a powerful impact. On average, a bombing 
mission carried out by a woman gets eight times as much press attention as a similar 
attack by a man.58 This is extremely significant in a situation where the goal of such 
operations is to generate a reaction from others and convey a political message. Bloom 
says, “Young women who combat Israel by blowing up their bodies generate a powerful 
symbol that creates publicity throughout the world. The image of women defying 
tradition to sacrifice their lives for the Palestinian cause has drawn international 
attention to the despair of the Palestinian people.”59 Beyond the shock value that suicide 
bombing generates in itself, the realization that a supposedly passive and victimized 
woman would be willing to blow herself up for a political cause is quite jarring for both 
insiders and outsiders to the conflict. Especially within Arab and Muslim culture, 
women are often limited from becoming public actors as opposed to being private 
actors within the home, and a woman undergoing this transformation from private to 
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public can garner a lot of attention. A woman’s action as a suicide bomber conveys her 
participation in a desperate situation and the lengths to which some Palestinians will go 
in their fight for autonomy. Militant groups who have recruited women to be bombers 
have capitalized on the impact that their participation creates by using the bombing as 
an opportunity to present a woman’s martyrdom as both a triumph and a tragedy and to 
generate sympathy among participants and onlookers alike. 
The inclusion of women in suicide bombing attacks also demonstrates that 
Palestinian militant groups are not all composed of religious fanatics who forbid the 
participation of women in the struggle for autonomy and a homeland, as stereotypes of 
such groups might suggest. It also indicates that they are changing their ideology to 
align more effectively with contemporary social and political pressures. Welcoming and 
celebrating the actions of female bombers serves a purpose that the same support of 
men’s actions would not fulfill: making the plight of the Palestinians more relatable. If a 
woman is internationally recognized for detonating a bomb in Israel while a man would 
be only mentioned in passing, then it is very worthwhile to the Palestinian cause to use 
women to facilitate as much publicity and promotion of political goals as possible. 
Bloom maintains that “this is a political war, not a religious war, and the suicide 
bombings are being carefully planned and executed as part of a precise political 
strategy.”60 The usage of women is a definite part of this strategy, whether they are 
participating through their own initiative or are being actively recruited. 
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Palestinian women undertaking jihad 
Between 2002 and 2009, ninety-six Palestinian women attempted suicide 
attacks, but only eight of them were successful because most of the women were 
preempted before they could complete their missions.61 A report by the Israel Security 
Agency states that between 2002 and 2009 there were 107 successful suicide bombings 
in Israel, 62 which when paired with the number of successful female bombers makes 
the fraction of bombings carried out by women just over 7% of the total.63 This does not 
seem like a very high rate of representation, but the examples of several of these 
women’s stories provide insight into the effect their successful missions had on their 
society and on other communities in the region.  
During the second Intifada, Yasser Arafat was having difficulty mobilizing 
people loyal to his Fatah organization and inspiring them to give their lives for his 
cause.64 He decided to turn to a largely untapped resource by stressing the importance 
of women’s participation in the uprising. On the morning of January 27, 2002, he gave a 
speech at his compound in Ramallah to over a thousand Palestinian women in which he 
said, “You are my army of roses that will crush Israeli tanks . . . You are the hope of 
Palestine. You will liberate your husbands, fathers, and sons from oppression.”65 That 
afternoon (perhaps by coincidence, as she did not attend the speech), Wafa Idris became                                                         
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the first woman to carry out a suicide bombing mission in Israel. The plan was for her to 
dress in Western clothing and transport a bomb through the military checkpoint between 
Ramallah and Jerusalem, where she would transfer the weapon to her brother so he 
could carry out the detonation.66 It is unclear whether Wafa chose to detonate the bomb 
herself or if an accident occurred, but the explosion resulted in the death of one Israeli 
and the injury of 131 others.67 By helping to facilitate a bombing, she became one of the 
few women who had joined the militancy at that point. 
Whatever the cause of the explosion, Wafa immediately became a revered figure 
in Palestine and the wider Arab community and set a precedent for other women. At the 
public memorial held on January 31st, around 3,000 people (mostly women) gathered to 
march through the streets of Ramallah, “chanting and carrying posters of other 
Palestinian heroes in a display of pride and joy.”68 Her photograph was displayed in the 
main square, ceremonies in her honor were held across the West Bank and Gaza, and 
there were ads in newspapers that praised her bravery.69 In her eulogy at the symbolic 
funeral held by Fatah, a council member said, “Wafa’s martyrdom restored honor to the 
national role of the Palestinian woman, sketched the most wonderful pictures of 
heroism in the long battle for national liberation.”70 Her actions inspired other young 
women to follow in her footsteps. 
In the three months following Wafa’s death, three other women carried out their 
own bombing missions in the Jerusalem area: Dareen Abu ‘Aisheh, an excellent student 
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and devout Muslim; Ayat al-Akhras, an eighteen year old girl; and Andalib Takatka, 
whose two female cousins had failed in their own mission. Ayat received the most 
public recognition after the completion of her bombing. In her pre-operation video, she 
admonished, “I say to the Arab leaders, Stop sleeping. Stop failing to fulfill your duty. 
Shame on the Arab armies who are sitting and watching the girls of Palestine fighting 
while they are asleep.”71 Her words were significant in an environment where men on 
both sides of the conflict were and are the ones who do almost all of the negotiating and 
decision making, and were in her eyes inadequate to the task.  
After her attack and the spring 2002 Israeli siege of the West Bank, public 
displays of support for militancy increased among women and girls throughout the 
region. Such displays were most notable in Egypt where women praised their 
Palestinian counterparts as heroes and threw stones at police guarding the Israeli 
consulate, and in Saudi Arabia where women passionately declared their support for the 
Palestinian cause in demonstrations, the largest of these encompassing about 1,000 
people.72 By becoming suicide bombers, these Palestinian women and those who 
followed after them inserted themselves into an arena dominated by men, and 
demonstrated one way for other women to escape the marginality they often 
experienced in national and regional politics.  
Leila Khaled 
It is pertinent to include Leila Khaled in a discussion of influential female 
Palestinian militants because she was perhaps the main forerunner for the women who 
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undertook missions after her, especially during the second Intifada. Although Khaled 
participated in militancy years before Idris and her counterparts, it is useful to discuss 
her last because she serves as an example of a woman who, although she has 
participated in militant activities, does not believe that suicide bombings are a beneficial 
way for women to participate in the public sphere. She also serves as a bridge between 
militant activity and political participation because of her roles in government later in 
life. 
While carrying out her missions, Khaled’s goal was to make a statement and 
gain leverage for her organization, not to kill people. Her motivation for undertaking 
acts of militancy was different from that of Idris and those who came after her, but 
Khaled’s impact was no less public or significant. During the Black September civil war 
with Jordan that began in 1969 and determined whether the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization or the Hashemite monarchy would rule the kingdom, Khaled took part in 
two plane hijackings as an agent of the communist-based group the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PFLP has come to be the second largest faction 
of the PLO after Fatah, and exercises a great deal of influence in Palestinian 
governance. 
 In 1969 Khaled, a beautiful woman in her early twenties, hijacked an Israeli 
aircraft on its way from Tel Aviv to London and diverted it to Damascus, where it was 
blown up after all the passengers had disembarked.73 Khaled escaped after she was put 
on the same bus as the victims.74 In 1970 Khaled wore a blond wig and boarded a TWA 
flight with two hand grenades concealed in her bra, with the goal of again destroying a                                                         
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plane that had been emptied of passengers.75 The mission was unsuccessful because 
before the hijacking could take place, Khaled was subdued and her male accomplice 
was killed, and she was arrested by British authorities.76 Her release was negotiated in a 
hostage exchange after she had spent twenty-eight days in jail.77  
Although Khaled did not kill anyone, she was and continues to be hailed as a 
symbol of armed struggle and of the Palestinian cause. She became a powerful symbol 
for the PFLP as well as a long-time active member of their Central Committee, claiming 
a spot in the Palestinian political arena as well as using her influence to speak publicly 
around the world about the Palestinian cause. She is immortalized in numerous portraits 
such as a huge mural on one of the Israeli barriers near Bethlehem, and her life is 
profiled in the film “Hijacker—The Life of Leila Khaled.” She believes that the only 
way for Palestinians to claim their land is through armed struggle, and that both men 
and women should struggle equally because all Palestinians suffer equally under Israeli 
occupation.78 However, perhaps surprisingly, her opinion on the use of female suicide 
bombers is critical. In a 2002 interview with journalist Barbara Victor, she says, “When 
religious leaders say that women who make these actions are finally equal to men, I 
have a problem. Everyone is equal in death . . . I would rather see women equal to men 
in life.”79 Her words speak to the issue that Palestinian women face in their endeavors 
to make a difference in the trajectory of the conflict. 
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It is very important that women have been publicly called upon to struggle in the 
name of the Palestinian cause, where previously they seem to have had a more 
marginalized role.  “Palestinian women are increasingly involved in all levels of 
terrorist activity, everything from scouting targets and smuggling guns and explosives 
to being suicide bombers.”80 But why are women seen as so inspiring by authority 
figures and the wider community mainly after they participate in acts of violence? 
According to Bloom, although women’s involvement in militant organizations 
worldwide is usually that of a sacrificial lamb and marginalized member of a 
movement, Palestinian groups are a notable exception. She asserts, “Palestinian women 
are acknowledged as the equal of men in the steadfastness of their opposition to the 
Occupation . . . The increasing number of female bombers shows how proactive 
Palestinian women really are.”81 Becoming a suicide bomber may demonstrate 
proactivity, but these bombings have not solved the conflict, made Israel more likely to 
give up its demands of a homeland, or given women more power in decision-making 
processes. As Leila Khaled said, the scope of women’s proactivity in becoming leaders 
and ending the conflict is better demonstrated by what they are able to achieve in life 
instead of in death. 
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Making an impact through non-violent and political opposition   
Although militant activities are often more news-worthy than grassroots 
activism and diplomatic negotiations, this does not mean that non-violent avenues of 
conflict negotiation and resolution are not being pursued. There is a long history of 
women’s participation in mobilizing their communities to both strengthen and support 
Palestinian society as well as women’s engagement in the political sphere at low and 
high levels. As demonstrated by the disparity between the amount of information 
available about female suicide bombers when compared to the information available 
about female Palestinian politicians, general knowledge about women’s participation in 
the political sphere is limited. However, Palestinian women have made important non-
violent contributions to their society and to the Palestinian struggle from before the first 
Intifada to the present.  
Women’s activism before and during the first Intifada 
While many historical accounts cite the First Intifada as the emergence of 
Palestinian women’s political activism, University of Kansas political science professor 
Deborah J. Gerner asserts that women were making important political contributions to 
the national struggle many years earlier. In the 1920s and 1930s Palestinian women 
(mostly urban, upper class, well educated, and from activist families) opposed the influx 
of European Zionists and also advocated for social welfare concerns in their 
communities.82 By the mid-1930s, women’s associations were engaging in                                                         
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demonstrations, fundraising for prisoners and their families, and smuggling and 
providing arms for the 1936 Arab Revolt. They raised regional and international support 
for the Palestinian national cause and participated in women’s conferences in many 
locations.83 After Britain suppressed the Arab Revolt and then the UN Partition Plan 
enabled the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the political activity of both 
Palestinian women and men dropped off sharply. When Israel declared independence, 
forces from Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the new state. An already 
declining Palestinian society was further decimated by the fighting, and a staggering 
number of Palestinians left or were expelled from their homes. This period is known 
among the majority of Arabs as the Nakba, or catastrophe. 
After the Palestinian Nakba, Palestinian women’s groups both within Israel and 
the Occupied Territories as well as exiled without were forced to return to activities 
more typical to women’s associations in the past, such as establishing a home for 
orphaned Palestinian children or a women’s self-help association.84 Another change 
came in the level of conservatism practiced in Palestinian society regarding the public 
behavior of women. One woman who had been active in the Arab Revolt commented, 
“in the [refugee] camps the Palestinian male became ultrastrict, even fanatic about the 
honor of his women. Perhaps this was because he had lost everything that gave his life 
meaning and honor was the only possession remaining to him.”85 One of the only parts 
of life that Palestinian men could control was the behavior of the women in their 
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families, and thus new restrictions for what was acceptable for women came to the 
forefront. 
 In 1965 people involved in the various Palestinian women’s organizations 
formed the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), which although independent 
when first established was quickly commandeered to function as a part of the PLO and 
was thus strongly influenced by the male-dominated PLO leadership.86 After the June 
War in 1967, Palestinians in Gaza began a three-year insurrection that was finally 
crushed by Israeli military leader Ariel Sharon.87 The existing charitable organizations 
formed a framework that women used to undertake resistance activities, especially as 
arrests and deportations had resulted in a vacuum of male leadership. These women also 
found themselves taking over the jobs of males in their families who had been jailed or 
expelled. 
By the early 1970s a peaceful resistance movement had replaced the failed 
armed resistance in Gaza and the West Bank, and this coincided with the Women’s 
Committees Movement which was facilitated by women from all of the major PLO 
factions.88 There were women’s branches of the DFLP, the Palestine People’s Party, the 
PFLP, and Fatah. “Each organization included the political emancipation and formal 
equality of Palestinian women in employment and education as part of its official 
mandate . . . At least initially, none addressed deeper social and cultural issues 
explicitly.”89 These committees focused on democracy, gender, and class concerns, as 
well as making an effort to network internationally with other feminist groups and                                                         
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activists through international conferences. However, involvement in this type of 
activity did not directly translate to involvement at the forefront of the Palestinian 
political sphere, and women found that although they were technically part of the 
political and intellectual process, the men were still the ones making the decisions in the 
end.90 This truth led the women’s committees to stop focusing on the highest levels of 
publicly-visible politics and to instead prioritize local, grassroots efforts to enhance 
women’s political participation at the lower levels.   
During the first Intifada, the mobilization and sustainment of the movement was 
brought about by mass-based organizations including those made up of students, 
workers, professionals, and women. Women’s committees were especially effective at 
meeting the needs of their communities; these organizations “tried to integrate political, 
social, and cultural features and addressed both the aspirations and the concrete needs of 
the population.91 Thus, women’s organizations were able to serve as avenues to sustain 
the intifada by promoting a unified social and political consciousness in the people they 
served. Women themselves were also intimately involved in all aspects of the resistance 
at the local level. “In the first Intifada, the site of struggle was the community, its 
streets, neighborhoods and homes, the ‘stone’ was the main weapon in defending the 
dignity of the community, and women participated in direct confrontations with the 
Israeli army, whether as demonstrators, stone-throwers or protectors and rescuers of 
young men.”92 These women were sources of strength and unification for their 
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communities and their participation in acts of resistance was integral to the organization 
of those activities. 
The period from 1978 to 1991 was dominated by wide-ranging grassroots and 
non-violent organization of women and girls. After the 1993 Oslo Accords the focus of 
most women’s organizations shifted from mobilization to state-building through the 
creation and maintenance of informal institutions. 93 With the second Intifada and a 
then-solidified Palestinian state government, there existed an elite leadership that was 
not responsible for specific constituencies but rather got its legitimacy from “’the 
people’ for its symbolic role as guardians of national liberation.”94 This leadership also 
largely replaced the political roles of informal institutions, which continues to limit the 
amount of participation people and particularly women are able to have in governance 
because only a certain number of people can be elected, and only a small percentage of 
this are women. The mass activism of women’s organizations in the first Intifada has 
been replaced by “an NGO model of lobbying, advocacy and workshop-style 
educational and developmental activities,”95 although these organizations also continue 
to take part in some protests and demonstrations. This type of community action is 
exemplified by the grassroots organizations described in detail below, as they do most 
of their work through capacity-building. There seems to be a disconnect between what 
grassroots organizations want to achieve and what they are actually able to do: a 
problem which may be abated by the enhancement of women’s greater participation in 
high-level politics. 
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The international donor community promotes gender issues in a limited context 
of state building through community-based services instead of in the context of a fight 
for independence and true democracy and progression toward equality.96 This may be 
out of practicality, because there are pressing problems that face Palestinians such as 
their lack of access to basic resources and services. CARE is an NGO which promotes 
the economic empowerment of women, but focuses its effort on meeting people’s basic 
needs and “strengthening the capacity of local organizations to support their neighbors 
in times of crisis, and to act as hubs of social, cultural, and economic support.”97 The 
World Bank funds projects for water supply and sewage system improvement, 
improving teacher education, and capacity-building for Palestinian economic and 
regulatory institutions.98 USAID has implemented projects for bolstering democracy 
through civic participation and local government infrastructure, but neither of them 
specifically address women’s political participation or gender equality.99 All of these 
projects involve helping Palestinians (including women) become self-sufficient and 
involved in their government, but they do not focus on encouraging increasing the 
number of women in places of power or on the issues that women face when trying to 
become politically active. 
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Contemporary grassroots organizations 
Many local Palestinian NGOs and CBOs (charity-based organizations) operate 
alongside their international counterparts. While the political impact of modern 
grassroots women’s organizations may be small or hard to measure, they nevertheless 
continue to exist and provide valuable services to their communities. It is difficult to 
find extensive information about most of the existing organizations because many of 
them probably do not have websites, and even the ones with websites are difficult to 
locate. For the purposes of this project I have chosen to focus mainly on organizations 
that maintain websites in both Arabic and English, because this gives them the 
capability to be more publically visible and reach a wider international audience.  
Examples of organizations with Arabic-only websites do deserve mention, and 
they include the organization Faten, which was established in 1999 and provides 
microloans to Palestinians who want to start small businesses, especially women.100 It 
has a special focus on helping women to become economically independent and 
therefore able to make more of their own decisions.101 Another organization is Jamaiya 
annahda annisa’iya (Women’s Renaissance Society), which was established in 1925 in 
Ramallah and strives to raise the status of women in social, cultural, and economic 
aspects.102 A third is Jamaiya wafaq li-raiya al-mer’a wa attefl (Wafaq Society for 
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Women and Child Care), which was established in January of 2010.103 Although it has a 
strong focus on women as victims of violence, it also promotes the principles of 
equality and women’s rights and participation.104 These organizations and others like 
them may not have the international outreach capability that groups which employ 
English-speakers have, but they have many of the same goals and are just as intimately 
involved with their communities. 
The four organizations introduced below (The Palestinian Working Woman 
Society for Development, The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global 
Dialogue and Democracy, Women’s Affairs Center, and Women’s Centre for Legal Aid 
and Counseling) all have lofty goals for the political integration of women, but their 
first priority is to provide opportunities to women for education and growth, 
independence, and human rights. Their existence and work toward changing political 
policy does not necessarily indicate actual progress toward greater involvement for 
women in the political sphere, but their work is legitimate and represents an important 
step in the direction of greater participation for women.  
The Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD) 
The Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development was established in 
1981 as the Union of Palestinian Working Women Committees, which was affiliated 
with the PFLP.105 “The organization believes that liberating women is connected 
directly with ending the occupation and establishing a full Palestinian democratic 
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sovereign state.”106 This is a strong and encouraging stance: one that shows how 
determined Palestinian women are to achieve political equality. In one of their 
brochures, PWWSD states that the only way to achieve the desired degree of 
development in women’s rights is if it is facilitated by a strong political will to 
eliminate all forms of discrimination, which will in turn enable social, economic and 
political progress both at the community and at high levels.107  
One of the programs the organization cites as its most important is the Women’s 
Empowerment in Decision Making Processes Program, which was initiated to help raise 
women’s awareness of their rights and to help their ability to protect and utilize these 
rights in public and private life. This outreach involves women helping other women, 
including educational lectures, workshops, and experience exchanges between women’s 
groups locally, regionally, and globally. These educational opportunities develop 
women’s knowledge of their rights, help change gender stereotypes, and build women’s 
leadership capacities.108 In this program PWWSD also gives special attention to female 
members of local decision-making bodies and other authorities in order to ensure that 
they are provided with adequate support. This is often achieved by forming shadow 
councils that back up the elected women in local councils, and by monitoring these 
local authorities to ensure their commitment to the principles of gender equality and 
respect for women’s rights.109  
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The organization has a variety of publications: a radio program called Through 
Women’s Eyes that discusses issues related to women and aims to create a public 
opinion that is supportive of women’s issues; a periodical magazine called Yanabee’ 
Magazine that analyzes social, developmental, and political issues from a woman’s 
perspective and creates social dialogue about women’s status and their social and 
national roles; and research and study findings that contribute to developing a 
progressive discourse in the community.110 Further efforts of the PWWSD go toward 
combating domestic violence and abuse of women and girls, and helping women get the 
tools and skills they need to be economically successful and independent.  
The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy 
(MIFTAH) 
MIFTAH was established in 1998 by Hanan Ashrawi, who continues to act as 
the organization’s director. The organization aims to empower effective leadership in all 
components of Palestinian society and to spread knowledge of the Palestinian cause and 
narrative globally to both official and popular entities and decision-makers.111 While the 
organization is not solely focused on women’s political participation, it does include 
this component as a key part of its mission, along with supporting the rights and 
political involvement of Palestinian youth. The project listed first on its website under 
programs and projects is one for empowering Palestinian women in leadership, which 
provides capacity-building and training sessions to young female activists in advocacy 
and issue-based campaigning, alliance building and networking, political 
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communication, and audio-visual media skills.112 The project also focuses on holding a 
series of roundtable discussions that create communication networks between the 
activists and the people in charge, enabling youth and especially women to express their 
needs and points of view.113 This project was designed to assist groups of young 
Palestinian women with being successful in community activism and aligns with the 
organization’s goal of supporting effective leadership at all levels of Palestinian 
governance. MIFTAH also stresses the importance of implementing UN Resolution 
1325, a measure that advocates for the wider participation of women in all levels of 
government and is discussed in greater detail below. 
Women’s Affairs Center (WAC) 
The Women’s Affairs Center is a Palestinian NGO established in 1991 and 
based in Gaza that advocates for women’s rights and gender equality. Its programs 
include capacity-building for women, research about political and societal issues related 
to women, and advocacy and communication about the problems Palestinian women 
face in working toward equality. Some of the workshops the organization has 
coordinated cover topics like preparing women to start their own small business and 
preparing female college graduates to enter the labor market. WAC also targets men in 
its outreach, holding workshops that raise awareness of women and gender issues in 
Palestinian society. The organization issues briefings on its website concerning topics of 
importance such as how women’s issues are addressed in the media and the proposal of 
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creating a unified document about Palestinian women’s issues for the use of researchers 
and other interested parties. WAC also publishes a magazine every few months called 
“Al Ghayda’a” that has covered important topics including women’s political 
participation, women with disabilities, and how the Palestinian Nakba has affected 
women. 
Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC) 
The WCLAC is a Palestinian non-governmental organization that seeks to 
develop Palestinian society through promoting the principles of gender equality and 
social justice. It was established in Jerusalem in 1991 and has special consultative status 
with the UN Economic and Social Council.114 Though the organization ideologically 
champions women’s rights in general, it focuses specifically on combating violence 
against women within the Palestinian community as well as the effects on women of 
increasing militarization due to the Israeli occupation. “To this end, WCLAC acts not 
only to reverse historical negligence, negative cultural legacies and discriminatory 
social attitudes towards Palestinian women, but also, to address the needs of women 
victimized by Israel’s violent actions in the occupied Palestinian Territories.”115  
The main strategic goals of WCLAC are to help protect and empower women 
who are experiencing discrimination and violence, and to promote women’s rights by 
opposing negative practices against women. WCLAC maintains a documentation and 
advocacy unit which promotes the adoption of legislation that adheres to international 
legal and human rights standards and protects and empowers women. Some of the legal                                                         
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issues they focus on include abortion, polygamy, equal legal status between men and 
women, divorce, and marriage age. They also actively document and work against 
femicide (also known as honor killing), as the extent of the problem is not widely 
tracked and publicized. In addition to this activism, WCLAC’s main work is to provide 
legal services including legal advice, court representation, and social counseling to 
mediate situations involving women and families and help women be empowered to 
make the best decisions for themselves and their families.116  
The organization also runs an around-the-clock shelter in the West Bank for 
domestic abuse victims that is formally designated by the Palestinian Authority as the 
primary resource for women in emergency situations. The organization works closely 
with the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs in the PA to increase its own capacity and to promote the growth of services 
available to women such as safe houses and shelters.117 Finally, WCLAC raises 
awareness about women’s rights and issues through holding workshops for both men 
and women in Palestinian communities that address topics of local importance. 
Women in high-level political roles 
Although most of them are relatively unknown to the rest of the world, there 
have been a number of influential women who were and are involved alongside their 
male counterparts at the highest levels of Palestinian politics. It is important to 
recognize their achievements and the challenges they and other aspiring female 
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politicians face in working toward equal participation. These women have laid a 
foundation of leadership that other women can continue to build upon. 
Samiha Khalil 
Samiha Khalil was born in 1923 in a Palestinian village on the West Bank called 
Anabta. She married at age seventeen and during the 1948 Nakba she and her family 
became refugees and were forced to flee to Lebanon.118 Although she graduated from 
high school at the same time as one of her sons in 1964, what she lacked in formal and 
higher education she made up for in passionate nationalism.119  
During the first elections in January of 1996 for the president of the PA and the 
members of the Legislative Council, 672 candidates competed for the eighty-eight seats 
on the Council. Twenty-eight of these candidates were women, and five women were 
elected.120 Samiha Khalil was the only candidate to run against Yasser Arafat in the 
presidential election, and she managed to garner ten percent of the vote.121 Even this 
small fraction is significant since Arafat was considered the father of the Palestinian 
resistance and had been an influential leader for decades preceding the election. Prior to 
the election, Khalil was a member of the Palestinian National Council, but did not 
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belong to any of the factions of the PLO.122 One article covering the election asserted 
that “many Palestinians say just the fact that she is posing an alternative to Mr. Arafat 
furthers democratic principles among Palestinians.”123 The same article quotes Khalil 
herself as saying, “I hope to win but, if I don't, it will be enough for me that I raised my 
voice high as a Palestinian woman, demanding the fulfillment of the dreams of 
Palestinians at home and abroad. I believe that women, like men, are fully entitled to 
lead the Palestinian people.”124 She did not win, but her presence as the only competitor 
against Arafat shows that it was and is possible for women to compete with men at the 
highest level of Palestinian politics. 
Interestingly, while Khalil cared deeply about the welfare of Palestinian women, 
she was described in one memorial account as a “reluctant feminist” and as promoting 
traditional Islamic and family values as more important than political equality between 
women and men.125 She considered women to be the building blocks of Palestinian 
society and wanted to help women, and especially female heads of households, to 
become self-sufficient and eventually able to engage with the building of Palestinian 
society on a political level. Khalil was a long-time grassroots activist, founding her own 
aid organization called Ina’ash al-Usra (revival of the family) in 1965 in her garage with 
a budget of $100 and a goal to help the children and wives of those imprisoned or killed 
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in resistance against Israel.126 Her charity continues to provide vocational training for 
thousands of women, self-help commercial enterprises, assistance for university 
students, and a range of educational and welfare activities for children.127 Though it 
came from modest beginnings, Ina’ash al-Usra has grown to have a $6 million annual 
budget and has positively impacted the lives of an impressive number of Palestinian 
families.128 She was also active before and during the first Intifada in its organization 
and in acts passive resistance and civil disobedience, which led to her being jailed six 
times by Israel.129 She continued to be politically and socially active until her death in 
1999 of natural causes. 
Hanan Ashrawi 
Hanan Ashrawi is arguably the most well-known Palestinian woman worldwide, 
and she has accomplished much in her political, academic, and activist careers outside 
her role in the PLC. Ashrawi was born to a prominent Christian Palestinian family in 
Ramallah in 1946. She was majoring in physics and attending the American University 
in Beirut during the Six Day War in 1967 where Israel was victorious, and as a result 
was counted as an absentee and not allowed to return home for five years.130  After the 
war, she was active in pursuing Palestinian rights and in 1969 attended her first 
conference of the General Union of Palestinian Students, where she was the only 
woman and was chosen as the spokesperson for the Lebanese chapter.131 This was also                                                         
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the first time that a woman had represented the PLO’s interests, and it gave her 
experience with debating issues in the pressured environment of the many conflicting 
and diverse factions that are present within the PLO.132 After she graduated from AUB 
in 1969, she attended the University of Virginia and received her doctorate in English 
and comparative literature in 1970. While working on her PhD and living in Virginia, 
she was exposed to civil rights activism and the push for women’s rights in the United 
States and this experience fueled and inspired her in her own endeavors in Palestine.133  
In the years after her 1973 return to Palestine she was a dean at Birzeit 
University, where she and many of her students were fiercely active in the fight for 
independence, organizing protests and marches.134 In April of 1988, a few short months 
after the beginning of the first Intifada, she was invited in her capacity as Dean to 
appear on ABC’s “Nightline” and participate in a panel discussion between three 
Israelis and three Palestinians about the problems that faced Israel on its fortieth 
anniversary as a state.135  She dazzled the world with her eloquence and her presentation 
of the plight faced by the Palestinians.136 Ashrawi was able to bring the Palestinian side 
of the story to international attention and presented a new image of Palestinians that was 
one of people who were willing to negotiate and not just participate in acts of terror.137 
Barbara Victor describes her performance: 
With eloquence and dignity Hanan told the Palestinian story in a 
language of tears. With clarity and composure she lowered the volume of 
disparity and dispute among the many diverse factions within the PLO.                                                         
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Never once did she falter in her presentation of her people’s side of the 
struggle: injustice when it came to the Palestinians, indulgence when it 
came to the Israelis. Within hours Hanan became the official voice of the 
Palestinian people, their most effective weapon since Yasir Arafat had 
embraced terrorism in 1965.138  
 
After this, her political career took off and she served as the official spokesperson for 
the PLO from 1991-1993. During this time she was a key participant in both the Madrid 
Peace Conference and Oslo Accords delegations.139 This influence gave her 
opportunities to speak around the world and garner support for the Palestinian side of 
the conflict, and to continue to present a new image of the PLO as a diplomatic and not 
a terrorist organization.  
In 1993 she resigned from her position as spokesperson due to what she saw as 
the political corruption of Yasser Arafat and his organization.140 In 1996 she was 
elected to serve on the PLC and became the Minister of Higher Education and 
Research. In 1998 she founded the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global 
Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) which seeks to end the Israeli occupation on the 
basis of humanitarian rather than ideological or historical grounds.141 In 2001, she was 
appointed as the spokeswoman for the Arab League with special responsibility for 
Palestinians.142 Ashrawi is the author of multiple publications about the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the peace process, and continues to be an activist and sought-
after speaker around the world, especially in the United States. 
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Isra al Modallal 
A second woman in a prominent spokesperson position is Isra al Modallal. She 
was appointed in November 2013 as the first female spokesperson of Hamas, becoming 
the public face of what was until recently the Hamas government in Gaza.143 Al 
Modallal was born and raised in Egypt as the daughter of Palestinian refugees.144 She is 
twenty-three and a media studies graduate of the Islamic University in Gaza, which has 
close ties with Hamas. She also studied in the UK as a teenager and is a divorced 
mother, a status which she says has given her freedom as her ex-husband helps to care 
for their daughter.145 “She wears a traditional headscarf along with a touch of makeup, 
listens to non-Islamic music and will on occasion shake hands with members of the 
opposite sex, behavior usually frowned on by Hamas.”146 She is decidedly different 
from the average Hamas representative. 
Al Modallal’s experiences as a journalist and working as a television reporter 
have prepared her for the job of liaising between Hamas and the international media.147 
“She plans to launch Twitter and Facebook campaigns in the near future to promote 
Hamas and its policies,”148 and also plans to focus on human rights and humanitarian 
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issues facing the Palestinian people. According to Al Jazeera, “she takes a slightly 
different line than many Hamas spokesmen. She refers to ‘Israel’ rather than the 
‘Zionist entity.’ She does not consider herself a Hamas loyalist but says she would be 
equally willing to work as spokeswoman for the [previously] rival Palestinian 
government in the West Bank.”149 Perhaps surprisingly, she is reported to not identify 
with any political faction. She says, “I am a Palestinian activist who loves her 
country.”150  
“According to Ihab al-Ghusain, head of the government media office in Gaza, 
Modallal's appointment was part of a program to develop dialogue with the west, to 
explain the Palestinian issues and Hamas's positions.”151 He also said that it additionally 
“falls within the framework of strengthening and emphasizing the role of Palestinian 
women.”152 This is an interesting step for Hamas, an organization which is seen by the 
West as one of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Changing the organization’s 
image is very important for garnering international support for the Palestinian cause, as 
is the integration of women into its ranks. While al Modallal does not have decision-
making power within Hamas, she does have the power of shaping the way the rest of 
the world will see the organization, and that is notable. 
Women in the Palestinian Legislative Council 
At present, there are a modest number of women participating in the highest 
levels of Palestinian politics. Within the PLC most parliamentarians can be divided into 
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the categories of Hamas-affiliated, Fatah-affiliated, and Independent. The female 
members of the PLC are split fairly evenly between the two largest factions Hamas and 
Fatah, with a few remaining Independent. The numbers of female participants have 
risen from the five women who were chosen during the first elections in 1996 to 
seventeen in 2006, but seventeen of the 132 members (about 12%) is still not a very 
high number, especially when taking into account the fact that only two of these women 
are actually members of the cabinet and the PNC Executive Committee. Additionally, 
the rest of the women are general parliamentarians elected from party lists, and none of 
them occupy the seats allotted for the official representatives of each constituency (the 
official representative of Gaza, for example). These women are wives, mothers, 
scholars, activists, and professionals in many fields. They come from diverse 
backgrounds but all have in common the desire to form a better future for Palestine and 
to ensure that women will continue to be able to occupy political leadership positions. 
Hamas lays claim to Mariam Mahmoud Saleh, who as the Minister of Women’s 
Affairs is one of the only female cabinet members of the PLC. She possesses a 
Doctorate in Islamic Law and is one of the few Hamas members who has never been 
taken into custody by Israel.153 Another parliamentarian, Jameela Abdallah al-Shanti, 
holds an English degree and has spent twenty years teaching English around the Arab 
world, is a lecturer at the Islamic University of Gaza, and heads the Women’s Activities 
Division of the Palestine Islamic Movement.154 A third member, named Sameera 
Abdullah Halaykah, holds a BA in Islamic Studies and is a journalist for two Hamas-
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affiliated journals. Her husband and son are imprisoned by Israel.155 Unsurprisingly for 
Hamas members, a few of the women openly present militant views. Houda Naim al-
Qrenawi, an activist in the Muslim women movement who was born in a refugee camp, 
said, “As a woman and an MP there are areas I want to concentrate on but that does not 
mean we have forgotten our struggle for our homeland, and preparing our children to 
die when the homeland calls for it.”156 Similar views were expressed by Mariam 
Muhammed Farhat, who said, “’I encouraged all my sons to die a martyr’s death, and I 
wish this even for myself.’”157 Three of her six sons were killed during the second 
Intifada, and she appeared on television in 2002 encouraging one of her sons before he 
carried out a mission in Gaza. Her electoral platform is the continuation of armed 
struggle, strengthening Islamic culture, compulsory hijab-wearing for Palestinian 
women, and a fight against poverty.158  
The female Fatah members outnumber those of Hamas by a few. One standout is 
Intisar Moustafa al-Wazir, who is the widow of former PLO military chief Khalil al-
Wazir and a founding member of the General Union of Palestinian Women. She has 
been a member of the PLC since 1974 and serves as the Minister of Social Affairs. She 
said, “’One woman in the National Authority is not enough . . . They have to be 
involved in all levels of government.’”159 Alongside her is Rabiha Thiab Hamdan, 
whose activism led to her first arrest by Israel at the age of twelve.160 Her incarceration 
time for other arrests and imprisonments totals about seven years, though she was able                                                         
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to hold various Fatah positions while in prison. She is also a board member of the 
GUPW, the PLO, and the Fatah Revolutionary Council. Other parliamentarians include 
Najat Omar Abu-Bakr, a political science PhD and the former head of consumer society 
at Ministry of Economy;161 Najat Ahmed Ali al-Astal, the general director of al-Amal 
Hospital in Gaza;162 and Jihad Abu Zneid, the project coordinator at Israel-Palestine 
Center for Research and Information and general secretary of the Union of Women’s 
Centers/Refugee Camps in Palestine and Diaspora.163  
The representatives of the Independent party include Khaledah Kanan Jarrar, a 
member of the PFLP who is known as an active defender of women’s rights;164 Rawia 
al-Shawwa, the former leader of the anti-Arafat bloc in the PNC;165 and the well-known 
Hanan Ashrawi.  
Women such as Samiha Khalil, Hanan Ashrawi, Isra al Modallal, and their 
counterparts in the PLC, represent the achievements in leadership and political 
participation Palestinian women have been able to enact at the highest political levels. 
Their accomplishments are both a culmination of women’s work towards empowerment 
in Palestine and a testament to the journey that still needs to continue in order to 
increase the number of women in Palestinian leadership positions. 
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Moving Forward  
It is clear that Palestinian women are in a position to increase their political 
participation through their established base of representation from the grassroots to the 
highest level in the political sphere. At this point, it is necessary to examine what 
measures are in place both externally and internally besides the activities of NGO/CBOs 
to help encourage and support more women to participate. It is also important to discuss 
internal barriers that Palestinian women face when trying to mobilize politically, in 
order to draw some conclusions about what courses of action might lead to a greater 
degree of political influence and visibility for Palestinian women. 
Palestine as a Non-Member Observer State of the United Nations 
There are no provisions for Permanent Observers in the UN Charter, but the 
practice of allowing them dates back to the 1946 acceptance of the Swiss Government 
as a Permanent Observer of the United Nations. Permanent Observers have free access 
to most meetings and relevant documents, but they are not member states and thus 
cannot vote on UN resolutions. Currently, the only other entity with this status besides 
Palestine is the Holy See. Palestine was voted into Non-Member Observer State status 
in 2012 by an overwhelming majority of 138 in favor to 9 against (including Israel and 
the United States).166  
Although Palestine has not been officially recognized as a state, its inclusion as 
an Observer implicitly gives it statehood status. Some representatives heralded the                                                         
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resolution as a step toward a two-state solution between Palestine and Israel, while 
others saw it as a hardening of positions and a widening of the rift between the two. 
After it was voted into the UN, “Palestine reaffirmed that it would always adhere to and 
respect the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and international law, uphold 
equality, guarantee civil liberties, uphold the rule of law, promote democracy and 
pluralism and uphold and protect the rights of women.”167 It is unclear whether the 
rights of women in this context include the right to equal political participation and the 
support for this participation.  
In Palestine’s quest for official statehood, even symbolic positions such as this 
are steps toward realizing that goal. Becoming a Permanent Observer might not afford 
Palestine greater international influence, but the support of the UN does give it greater 
legitimacy. An implicit conferment of statehood does not bind Palestine to adhere to the 
UN Charter, but a commitment to human rights and equality reflects positively on 
Palestine and could aid in achieving official Member State status in the future. This 
should make Palestine more willing to comply with international standards for 
treatment of women, which is helpful for individuals and organizations within Palestine 
that are trying to improve women’s political participation. Perhaps implicit statehood 
could also make Palestine more likely to adhere to resolutions such as 1325. 
UN resolutions advocating for women’s political participation  
In 2000 the United Nations passed Resolution 1325 which emphasized the 
importance of facilitating women’s involvement in conflict resolution and peace-
building, and encouraged member states to work to integrate women more fully into                                                         
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political processes. Language from the document says that the resolution “Urges 
Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making 
levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the 
prevention, management, and resolution of conflict,”168 and also that it is important to 
implement “measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous 
processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation 
mechanisms of the peace agreements.”169 It is clear that the UN and wider international 
community recognize how valuable the contribution of women is to peace efforts at all 
levels, which makes possible diplomatic solutions that come from more than one facet 
of society and represent a wider range of interests.  
In 2013, the subsequent Resolution 2122 was passed to reaffirm the Security 
Council’s commitment to supporting and implementing Resolution 1325 and others. It 
states that the persisting barriers to full implementation of Resolution 1325 will only be 
demolished through “dedicated commitment to women’s empowerment, participation, 
and human rights, and through concerted leadership, consistent information and action, 
and support, to build women’s engagement in all levels of decision-making.”170 The 
resolution “further recognizes with concern that without a significant implementation 
shift, women and women’s perspectives will continue to be underrepresented in conflict 
prevention, resolution, protection and peacebuilding for the foreseeable future.”171 
While this resolution does not specifically mention Palestine, it is worth noting that the                                                         
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Security Council chose to pass Resolution 2122 when an evaluation of the world-wide 
progress of Resolution 1325 found it lacking. Its passage in 2000 was optimistic about 
the future of women’s political participation, but reality has proven that a large degree 
of internal effort and possibly outside assistance is needed in order to implement the 
changes called for in the resolution, especially in increasing the power of women in 
decision-making at high levels. 
An example of attempts to apply Resolution 1325 in Palestine can be found in a 
publication produced by MIFTAH on the integration of Resolution 1325 with its 
programs for women’s empowerment, which states that as there is overlap between the 
resolution’s tenets and the goals of the women’s movement, a thorough linkage of the 
two is necessary and beneficial.172 The report states that despite the PNA adopting 
policies to improve women’s political participation and establish a foundation for 
equality such as electoral quotas, “women’s contribution to leadership in institutions of 
sovereignty continues to be limited, symbolic and not comprehensive. Women’s 
presence is restricted to administrative and junior positions.”173 Resolution 1325 
presents a framework that can be adopted and improved on by Palestinians to help 
facilitate women’s integration into politics and peacebuilding at the middle and high 
levels. In order for Resolution 1325 to become an activated part of the Palestinian 
political and social sphere, it needs to become rooted in the Palestinian consciousness; 
this can be accomplished by linking it theoretically and practically with Palestinian 
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women’s movements like MIFTAH,174 because they are intimately involved with the 
communities in which they are based and should be able to use this connection to 
spread their message to a broad base of people. MIFTAH proposes that a coalition be 
formed of members from groups like itself, female politicians, and other female 
professionals, who will design and implement an action plan for employing the 
resolution and serve as a bridge between the Palestinian women’s movement and the 
UN, Palestinian politicians, the media, and other women’s coalitions globally.175 The 
coalition would also serve as a link between the resolution and the grassroots level of 
women’s mobilization. The article additionally addresses a need to deal with internal 
conflict before Resolution 1325 can be implemented. This might consist of actions such 
as educating people (especially mothers and young women) about the importance of 
dialogue and tolerance of the other, building crisis resolution and management skills, 
and addressing the issue of lawlessness and violence against women in the 
community.176  
While MIFTAH has been the main organization involved in promoting 
Resolution 1325, there are other groups that are working to implement it as well. An 
organization called the Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center (or Wi’am) has played a 
role by holding a seminar in December of 2008 with Palestinian, Israeli, and Swedish 
women to discuss how Resolution 1325 is applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict.177 The WCLAC (discussed previously) has used the resolution as a basis for its 
work with women living under the occupation.178 In Gaza, two organizations, the 
Wissal Coalition and The Culture and Free Thought Association, have jointly run a 
project to raise awareness about the resolution and support networking among civil 
society organizations.179 To address the lack of knowledge about the resolution, the 
Majed Women’s Association and the Center for Women’s Affairs in Gaza have jointly 
issued and publicized a brochure on the resolution’s importance and on the need to 
strengthen education campaigns with women in different groups.180  
Plans such as these are encouraging, but there is a definite gap between such 
plans and actual implementation of the resolution throughout Palestine. A report 
submitted in 2009 to Norwegian Christian Aid states that despite some successful 
attempts among Palestinian women’s groups at implementing the resolution, even nine 
years after the forming of the resolution “the Palestinian women’s movement does not 
fully incorporate the articles of Resolution 1325 into the nationalist and feminist 
struggles. Indeed, many Palestinian feminist organizations are still unaware that the 
resolution exists.”181 While President Abbas issued a decree in 2005 recognizing the 
legitimacy of Resolution 1325 and calling upon all PNA organizations to support the 
“full and equal participation of women in efforts to keep peace and security,” there is 
                                                        
177 Dr. Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian, “The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 
Implementation in Palestine and Israel 2000-2009,” Norwegian Christian Aid (February 2010), 29, 
Accessed 21 April 2014, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/NGO/unscr-
1325_implementation-in-israel-and-palestine-2000-2009.pdf. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 30. 
181 Ibid., 22. 
 
 
58  
still no formal action plan for national implementation of the resolution.182 This 
demonstrates the difficulty Palestinian women face in applying a theoretical concept to 
the reality of their political network. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
CEDAW was conceived of as a culmination of women’s activism worldwide 
and as a complement to the International Bill of Human Rights, the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights, and other human rights treaties because of a lack of 
specific focus on the promotion and advancement of women’s rights worldwide that 
dealt with discrimination against women in a comprehensive way.183 The text of the 
Convention was negotiated and drafted over a period of several years from 1976-1979, 
and adopted by the General Assembly in 1979. Originally under the authority of UN 
Women, responsibility for the Convention was transferred to the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in 2008. The Convention is overseen by members of 
the Commission on the Status of Women that serve two-year terms and are made up of 
experts in the field covered by the Convention. Currently the committee is staffed by 
all-female members, including elected representatives from Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon, 
Egypt, and Israel.184  
The Convention consists of a preamble and thirty articles that define 
discrimination against women and delineate a plan for states to end such discrimination. 
Importance is placed upon securing the rights of women in the political sphere as well                                                         
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as the social sphere. “The Convention provides the basis for realizing equality between 
women and men through ensuring women's equal access to, and equal opportunities in, 
political and public life—including the right to vote and to stand for election—as  well 
as education, health and employment.” Article 7 of the Convention establishes that 
states shall uphold women’s right to “participate in the formulation of government 
policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public 
functions at all levels of government,” and Article 8 states that women should be also be 
able to represent their governments at the international level.185 Article 5 directs states 
to take appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural behaviors of both men 
and women to eliminate prejudice and stereotypes about the roles of men and 
women.186 Countries that have ratified the Convention are legally bound to put its 
provisions into practice, and must also submit reports at least every four years to 
demonstrate how they are attempting to comply with the obligations set forth in the 
Convention.  
Although Israel has ratified CEDAW and made progress in providing equal 
rights for Israeli women, very little mention is made in its reports to the committee 
about efforts to secure the rights of Palestinian women. In fact, Israel was chastised by 
the committee during the 2011 session for its breaches of CEDAW in regard to 
Palestinian women, especially those who are refugees and internally displaced, as Israel 
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holds that the Convention is not applicable to the Occupied Territories.187 Because 
Palestine is not officially a state it is unable to ratify the Convention, but it is able to 
participate in committee proceedings to some degree as NGOs are invited to both attend 
conferences and contribute reports on topics of which the committee should be aware. 
These can be oral or written alternative/shadow reports of the one submitted by the 
country the NGO is concerned with, or other country-specific information. This is 
important because it allows Palestine to present an alternative point of view from that of 
Israel, and to include information that Israel itself might not want to present to the 
world. The WCLAC submitted one such report for the 48th session of the committee in 
2011, which provided information to the committee about the hardships experienced by 
Palestinian women as a result of the Israeli occupation. According to the report, Israeli 
destruction and confiscation of Palestinian land and property disproportionally affect 
Palestinian women because without homes and property they lose a lot of capacity for 
self-determination and economic independence and they are more likely to be victims of 
physical violence.188 Although Palestine cannot be officially part of the Convention, it 
is fortunate in the context of bringing attention to the rights of Palestinian women that 
the committee recognizes the value of non-state actors as well. As with its status as a 
Permanent Observer, Palestine and its female representatives are finding ways to 
participate in the international political arena despite their lack of statehood.                                                         
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Barriers to women’s participation 
In addition to acknowledging outside support for women’s political 
participation, it is necessary to examine the obstacles that need to be overcome before 
such outside help can be effective. While it is true that there are women at even the 
highest levels of Palestinian politics, overall their occupation of decision-making 
positions is lacking. “Despite their important contribution to the liberation struggle over 
many generations, women are strikingly absent from the current state-building 
discourse and occupy very little of the public political space that produced it.”189 
Although the political and social situation of the occupation has allowed some 
Palestinian women to access public spaces in a way that women in some other Arab 
countries would have no chance of doing, the majority of Palestinian women still 
remain removed from the political sphere. Furthermore, it seems that questions of 
securing women’s rights have often been viewed by those with political power and by 
Palestinians as a whole as having much less importance than the pressing matter of 
Palestinian liberation and nationalism.  
In this drawn-out struggle for independence, it is essential to ensure that the 
institutions that have power in the post-conflict situation will recognize the 
contributions of women to ending the crisis and commit to protecting their political, 
social, and economic equality by being informed and responsive to women’s needs.190 
While there is a significant amount of rhetoric concerning the need to uphold gender 
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equality as an important part of establishing the independent State of Palestine, the 
regular exclusion of women from political decision-making at both low and high levels 
undermines previous political gains made by women and allows women’s interests to be 
neglected instead of advanced.191 Women do participate, but they are most often not the 
ones in control. This connects to the fame and praise afforded to female suicide 
bombers as heroines in the fight for independence, when in reality their actions have not 
advanced women’s rights or ability to participate in politics. They are celebrated as 
symbols of female power, but only in death, as Leila Khaled said. There has been a 
seemingly backwards progression from the time of the first Intifada, when women were 
integral to supporting their communities and leaders in organizing and carrying out acts 
of civil disobedience and protest.  
This phenomenon of symbolic power carries over to women in elected positions 
as well. After the PLC elections in 2006, Hadeel Rizq-Qazzaz, a women’s rights activist 
and gender and development specialist in Ramallah, noted that many of the women who 
ran for election may have participated only as stand-ins for male family members, or 
because they were used by political factions as token representatives and not as real 
political participants.192 The Palestinian election system involves party lists that are 
controlled by males, although there is now a quota that guarantees one fifth of local 
council seats for women.193 Election quotas like this have been received with mixed 
reactions. In a positive light, although they are forced on both the political parties and 
the electorate, they do speed up the process of bringing women into the political                                                         
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arena.194 More negatively, the quotas are seen by many as giving women a seat at the 
political table but still not allowing them their voices and the ability to politically 
address women’s issues in addition to the goals of their parties. Although the quotas 
might appear to be increasing women’s political representation, it is not clear how much 
real power female elected representatives have to pursue their own agendas and those of 
the wider female Palestinian public.  
Rizq-Qazzaz also observed that NGOs professing to support women’s political 
participation were actually only focusing on well-known female activists who had the 
experience and ambition (and ability) to run for elections, ignoring women at the 
grassroots level and preferring their own members or the members of established 
political parties.195 One big problem faced by Palestinian women in politics is the large 
cultural, social, and economic gap between female elected officials and women at the 
grassroots level. Many of the women who are willing or supported to run for political 
office are well educated and/or have grown up as secular Muslims or Christians (Hanan 
Ashrawi, for example), and often come into the socio-political sphere through previous 
work with NGO or volunteer organizations.196 Many of these women have a greater 
number of opportunities for political mobility and are freer to move about in society 
than their less-educated, poorer, and more traditional counterparts. This is an issue 
because it can alienate more traditional women who see independent activity outside the 
home and having enough leisure time to spend in nonessential work as contrary to old 
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values and an Arab identity, and as associated with foreign ways of life.197 An 
important thing to remember when considering the spaces women occupy in Palestinian 
society is that “there is no archetypal Middle Eastern woman. Rather, women exist in 
different socieoeconomic and cultural arrangements, stratified by class, ethnicity, 
education, age, religious ideology, and politics.”198 Because of this, women’s political 
consciousness and activism are strongly influenced by a wide variety of factors and this 
has had a bearing on what types of political participation they are undertaking. These 
divisions affect how women and groups from voters up to the PNC view and interact 
with each other. 
Another barrier to cohesive political organization is the disparity between 
practical capacity and political activism that exists between different types of 
Palestinian women’s organizations. Some women’s organizations have come to 
associate politics with political parties and a political elite that is seen as untrustworthy 
and not representative of the Palestinian people, and this has been detrimental to the 
amount of political work the organizations have been able to do. Some organizations 
refrain from expressing a political stance for fear of jeopardizing their relationships with 
their beneficiaries, partners, and the donor community.199 None of the four Palestinian 
grassroots organizations discussed above mentions an affiliation with a particular 
faction, perhaps for this reason. Community-based and charitable organizations 
especially, while deeply embedded in their client base and thus in a position to exercise 
a considerable amount of influence, often do not openly engage in political issues such                                                         
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as the occupation, party politics, or combating patriarchy.200 While the women running 
these CBOs and charities may have a thorough understanding of how the separation 
barrier, restrictions on movement and patriarchal control of economic and political 
space affect every aspect of their work, they are unlikely to openly identify them as the 
root causes of poverty and women’s exclusion.201 This may be due to a fear of being 
considered political or a limitation in their capacity to articulate their political work, but 
whatever the reason, it results in CBOs and charities being unable to identify their 
political partners and use an analysis of the political situation to develop their programs 
and campaigns most effectively.202  
In contrast, many NGOs (especially feminist and specialized NGOs) do have the 
ability to outline highly political missions and objectives as well as publically discuss 
the political and social causes of women’s difficulty in entering the political sphere.203 
They are also aware of the vocabulary and mechanics of the international donor system, 
which can help them navigate among outside sources of support. However, while NGOs 
often have a more politically savvy insight into women’s issues, they can be unable to 
connect with their communities with the same intimacy and effectiveness of their lower-
level counterparts. These NGOs carry out the work that would normally be done by 
governmental institutions but that is uncompleted under the weight of political divisions 
and the occupation. However, like CBOs they also may not recognize or discuss their 
political role in explicit terms. PWWSD’s mission statement, for instance, highlights the 
importance of gender equality and eliminating discrimination, but it does not mention                                                         
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the issues that cause such disparity.204 By contrast, MIFTAH was very politically and 
physically active during the 2012 local elections through helping female candidates 
with their campaigns and lobbying political factions to increase the number of female 
candidates and move them to the top of the lists.205  
The wide range of foci and capacities among all types of Palestinian non-
governmental organizations means that it would be hard for them to present a unified 
front. CBOs, charities, and all types of NGOs and other service providers are “choosing 
not to work together on a joint platform, operate with different vocabularies, have 
different areas of expertise and are unlikely to engage in conversations about the 
political role they might play together.”206 This is probably one of the biggest barriers 
that women face in organizing politically, because even existing organizations have so 
far been unable to support each other and work toward a common agenda, even though 
they share many of the same goals. 
Another barrier is a resurgence of Islamic conservatism that has occurred in the 
last two decades. During the time of the first Intifada many gains were made for secular 
feminism, but now there is a reversion to a more conservative and traditionalist 
perspective especially in Hamas and its affiliates. Jameela al-Shanti, a representative of 
Hamas in the PNC, touts Islamic fundamentalism as a way to draw women more into 
employment and social activity of all kinds, saying “A woman can go out veiled and do 
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all kinds of work without any problem.”207 Her reference to the veil can be interpreted 
to mean that a woman can be a devout and conservative Muslim and still accomplish 
her goals. This is undoubtedly true, but the wider cultural terrain of conservatism does 
present challenges for women who want to become public actors instead of remaining 
private as tradition dictates. Many young women are attracted to this Islamic feminism 
as a kind of nationalistic unification, which is frustrating to secular feminists who have 
worked hard to progress toward the separation of politics and religion. Although 
proponents of an Islamic political system would say that Islam provides for the 
inclusion and independence of women in the social sphere, the vision of what this 
entails often clashes with secular ideals of fairness as well as the outlook of a sizeable 
Christian minority. 
Because the majority of Palestinians are Muslim, political initiatives that support 
making Islam a greater part of Palestinian politics and society are met by many with 
agreement or acceptance.208 However, Islamic interpretations of gender differences and 
of what men and women should and should not do can be varied. There are verses in the 
Quran that clearly uphold men and women as equal in the eyes of God and in their 
duties to adhere to their religion, along with their rewards for doing so. On the other 
hand, there are also various verses that establish men’s dominance over women. While 
the “truth” is subject to interpretation, fundamentalists tend to err on the side that 
inhibits women’s participation in the public sphere despite their assurances that 
conservative interpretations of Islam ensure women’s freedom, and this is detrimental to                                                         
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broadening societal acceptance of women in positions of power. Not insignificantly, 
most if not all of this interpretation is done by men and has a direct impact on women’s 
ability to participate. For example, in 2013 Hamas banned female participants from a 
UN-sponsored marathon, prompting organizers to cancel the race.209 “Women have also 
been barred from riding on motorcycles while there have been complaints of social 
pressure on them to wear Islamic head covering.”210 Restrictions like these, even when 
combined with advancements such as encouraging political participation through 
Hamas’ appointment of Isra al Modallal, do not contribute to the elevation of women’s 
rights and roles as a whole.  
Perhaps the most substantive problem facing Palestinian women as political 
agents is the occupation itself. The construction of the wall and check points has 
exacerbated already existing difficulties women face in society, including illiteracy, 
unemployment, poverty, and a lack of human rights.211 A limitation in mobility affects 
every aspect of women’s lives and creates a huge burden for them to bear, whether they 
lose access to their jobs and therefore the ability to be self-sufficient, they lose access to 
hospitals and healthcare, or they are separated from family members. The wall also 
serves to totally fragment Palestinian society and prevent the effective networking and 
mass-mobilization that was previously possible. With these physical tools of 
oppression, “Israel has exercised authority over the years to deny Palestinians access to 
livelihoods, social contact and national unity. In this context, women’s roles in direct 
resistance are minimal, given the absence of community context, the militarized 
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environment and the differential impact of restrictions on mobility on women.”212 If 
women are struggling just to survive and support their families, it is no surprise that 
their ability to participate in politics at local and higher levels is impeded. 
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Concluding thoughts  
Palestinian politics have a long way to go before women and women’s interests 
are adequately represented in the political sphere. Electoral quotas are a start, but they 
do not always translate into actual political influence and decision-making power. From 
the outside, it seems as though the situation is at a stalemate, with neither Israel nor 
Palestine willing to abandon grievances or give in to the other’s demands. The foremost 
issue faced by women who want to mobilize politically is the occupation, and the 
occupation will only be ended by effective negotiation. This negotiation would 
reasonably have a greater chance of success if it included more input from Palestinian 
women, because they represent a fundamental part of Palestinian society and could be 
instrumental in negotiating a solution that is tailored to the needs of the Palestinian 
people.  
Across the Middle East, women are politically marginalized to varying degrees. 
This region of the world is also often featured in the news as perpetually plagued by 
violent conflict. From long standing issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the 
violence surrounding the effort to topple Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to Bashar al-Asad 
starving his own population in Syria in the name of quelling insurgency, it is clear that 
the usage and development of conflict resolution and peace-building skills and 
processes is severely lacking, both within the region and from outside attempts of 
assistance. If the empowerment of women in these processes could make a difference in 
the outcome of these conflicts, it could have a profound impact on the future of relations 
between entities within Israel-Palestine and the region as a whole, along with providing 
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an example of positive and effective political involvement of women for other areas of 
the world that experience similar issues and are also working toward enabling their own 
women to exercise the influence they deserve. For the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
particular, any hope at ending the bloodshed has been hard to come by and new 
approaches involving a wider segment of Palestinian society should definitely be 
implemented. 
Palestinian women successfully completing suicide bombings may be 
considered more news-worthy than a woman winning a seat on a local council by 
popular election, but it is these small political victories that may over time build into a 
high level of influence and visibility for women involved in peacebuilding. However, 
Palestinian women’s achievements in politics so far should not be discounted. From 
before the first Intifada to the present these women have found ways to build up their 
nation and work toward realizing a Palestinian state. In the 2012 local elections, for the 
first time ever there were two all-female lists competing, as well as ten other lists that 
featured a woman at the top.213 The number of women who were elected to serve on 
local councils increased from the last election, and even exceeded the quota by a small 
margin.214 These are encouraging results, and hopefully this is the start of a new trend in 
the structure of Palestinian politics.  
Palestine is in a time of transition at present after the announcement of its new 
unity government and the planned elections within the next six months. This is a chance 
for Palestine to choose to make women an integral part of its government, just as they 
are an integral part of society. International support such as Resolution 1325 and                                                         
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CEDAW can serve as a base for a political and social environment that is inclusive and 
supportive of female leaders, but the true impetus for change needs to come from within 
Palestine itself. This impetus must come from all segments of society, but it may be up 
to women to start the process themselves. I believe that if all sectors of the female 
political sphere from voters to NGOs to the PNC could find a way to connect and work 
together, they would create a formidable force for peace: an Army of Roses focused not 
on destruction but on the creation of a present and a future that will benefit the 
generations to come. 
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